In a model of evolution driven by conict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the inuence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions dier in their exclusiveness we nd that these hegemonies will be ineciently extractive in the sense of having ineciently high taxes, high compensation for state ocials, and low welfare. JEL Classication Numbers: D74 (Conict Resolution), C73 (Evolutionary Games), D02 (Institutions) 
Introduction
A robust nding of the game theory literature is that with the possibility of future punishment and rewards there are many possible equilibria. One interpretation is that these represent alternative social norms or institutions. Indeed, we do observe a wide array of dierent institutions both across space and time: political systems in particular range from relatively autocratic (exclusive in our terminology) to quite democratic (inclusive in the terminology of Acemoglu and Robinson [3] ). A natural question is the positive one: among these dierent institutions are we more likely to observe some than others? Are ecient institutions likely to be more successful than inecient ones? A natural setting for this question is an evolutionary oneand one possible answer is that of Ely [25] 3 who shows how voluntary migration leads to eciency. But we do not believe that historically people have moved from one location to another through a kind of voluntary immigration into the arms of welcoming neighbors. Rather people and institutions have more often spread through invasion and conict. Moreover, institutional change has generally arisen in the aftermath of the disruption caused by warfare and other conict between societies. This leads us to address the question of which institutions are likely to be long-lived in the context of evolution driven by conict between societies. When evolution is driven by conict we nd that the long-run favors not institutions that maximize welfare or per capita output, but rather institutions that maximize state power. These institutions have ineciently high taxes and state power and are not terribly inclusive. While these state power maximizing institutions are hegemonic (within their geographical area of inuence) for long periods of time, these hegemonies are periodically broken with shorter periods of conict between competing -and possibly more ecient -states.
The idea of history being dominated by hegemonic states may seem a strange one, but with some important exceptions it is borne out by historical facts. 4 Take, for example, the largely geographically isolated region of China: bounded by jungles 3 Ely uses a model similar to the one used here, but similar results using more biologically oriented models have been around for some time. For example Aoki [1] uses a migration model to study eciency, while more recently Rogers, Deshpande and Feldman [45] use a migration model to show how unequal resources can lead to long-run inequality.
4 Sources and calculations of historical data on hegemonies and population is in Appendix 1. There are also, however, two glaring exceptions: except for brief periods neither the subcontinent of India nor, following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the area of continental Europe were subject to a hegemonic state.
Our theory predicts hegemony only under conditions where geography does not matter, and we would argue that in the cases of both continental Europe and India the inuence of outsiders protected by strong geographical barriers was important.
In the case of Europe following the fall of Rome and up to around 1066 we have the continued interference of northerners -the Vikings especially were well protected by their own geography. Following 1066 we have the constant interference of England -also safe behind a water barrier: during this period we observe that England constantly intervened in continental conicts but always to support the weaker side, and eventually this policy of balance of power became explicit.
5 India also was subject to repeated invasion from central Asia -protected not by water but by dicult desert and mountain terrain.
6 Of course China too was subject to outside inuence 5 It is not completely correct to view England and Scandinavia as outsiders as at various time they had continental interests and conversely, but the key point is that they had a core area relatively safe from invasion. In a dierent direction Homan [32] argues a role also for the Western Catholic church which in Europe, and only there, has acted as a balancing force much akin to to the outsiders of our model. 6 The exact nature of the asymmetry in the physical geographical barrier is uncertain, but it is a fact that India has been invaded numerous times successfully from Central Asia, but there have been no successful conquests of Central Asia from India. Phil Homan in a private communication 2 -particularly that of the Mongols. However, the relative size of the Mongolia is quite small relative to China -less than half a percent of the population -while the population of Scandinavia was about 5% that of continental Europe, that in central Asia about 5% that of India, while England was about 8% of continental Europe.
These exceptions are in fact exactly what is predicted by our evolutionary theory:
we show that as outside inuence grows the fraction of time hegemony will reign decreases.
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With respect to institutions, as we indicated, states with greater power will have an advantage over less powerful states. To focus thinking we examine a simple model in which institutions and incentives determine state power. A key question is why individuals in a society will contribute to state power? First, there is a signicant public goods problem. Worse, given that outside conquest and disruption is relatively rare, it is hard to believe that military spending levels would stand much of a cost-benet analysis, so that the good of state power is perhaps not very good at all. Hence while the public goods problem may be solved by a state run by ocials who collect taxes, the question remains why these ocials do not collude to consume tax revenue rather than use it to augment the power of the state. The answer we propose to this question is that the incentive of state ocials to acquire state power is not so much in defense of the state from intruders but rather to collect taxes from which they can consume and to maintain themselves in oce. Roughly speaking we view state ocials as preferring to consume jewelry rather than swords, but they need the swords to collect the tax revenue to pay for the jewelry. We model this in a simple way by assuming that greater state power increases the ability of the state to collect taxes. Of course a more powerful state enables the collection of greater revenues for ocials only if the army and other forces of state power respond to the wishes of those ocials. Whether this is true depends on inclusivity of institutions.
suggests that part of the answer may lie in the fact that the area of Central Asia is well suited for raising horses and India is not, and that horses play a central military role in conict between Central Asia and India.
7 Note that geographical factors matter in our argument only in so far as they give rise to outsiders who inuence the evolution of the relationships between the other groups. An existing literature, including Diamond [20] , gives physical geography a direct role, arguing for example that the terrain of Western Europe is more defensible than that of China, hence less susceptible to hegemony. Besides this particular claim being challenged on physical grounds (Homan [32] ), such considerations have no bite in the Indian case. Incidentally: while this discussion includes only the area of Europe, Asia and North Africa, it should be borne in mind that until modern times 90% of the world population lived in this area.
In an inclusive democracy, for instance, this is not so much the case -ocials may try to send the army into the streets to collect revenues for their own benet, but in a meaningful democracy the army will be loyal to institutions not persons and will not follow such orders.
Putting the paper in context, the idea that evolution can lead to both cooperation and ineciency is scarcely new, nor is the idea that evolutionary pressure may be driven by conict. There is a long literature on group selection in evolution: there may be positive assortative matching as discussed by Bergstrom [6] . Or there can be noise that leads to a trade-o between incentive constraints and group welfare as in the work of Price [42, 43] . Yet another approach is through dierential extinction as in Boorman and Levitt [10] . Conict, as opposed to migration, as a source of evolutionary pressure is examined in Bowles [12] , who shows how intergroup competition can lead to the evolution of altruism. Bowles, Choi and Hopfensitz [14] and Choi and Bowles [16] [36] or Bottazzi and Dindo [11] . Some of this work is focused more on biological evolution than social evolution. As Bisin [7] and Bisin and Topa [8] point out the two are not the same. This paper is driven by somewhat dierent goals than earlier work. We are interested in an environment where individual incentives matter; and in an environment where the selection between the resulting equilibria are driven by conict over resources (land) . By combining the idea of the conict resolution function introduced by Hirshleifer [31] and subsequently studied in the economic literature on conict 8 with the stochastic tools of Kandori, Mailath and Rob [35] , Young [49] and Ellison [24] we are able with relatively weak assumptions to show when state power maximizing hegemonies do and do not arise.
8 See, for example, Garnkel and Skaperdas [29] or Hausken [30] . An important focus of this literature has been in guring out how shares of resources are determined by the conict resolution function.
2. A Static Example
We start with a simple static model of how state power is determined by institutions and incentives within a society. The size of a society, in terms of land resources controlled, will play a crucial role in in the evolutionary dynamics, but as we assume constant returns to scale in land, land plays no role in the statics, so here we conduct the analysis per unit of land. As summarized in the introduction, the idea for this model is that state power determines strength in conict, but of- describing social institutions. The institutions that give rise to χ we view as xed in the short-run described here although in the dynamic model they will change over time in response to evolutionary pressures. 9 The relevant aspect of institutions summarized by the parameter χ describes the extend to which institutions enable the use of state power to collect taxes.
10 It represents the exclusivity of those institutions: relatively inclusive institutions, such as democratic one, use a variety of checks and balances to limit the application of state power -courts, appeals processes and so forth. In the extreme when χ = 0 we imagine that it is essentially impossible to collect taxes because individuals who fail to pay taxes may engage in endless appeal to the courts. At the opposite extreme when χ = 1 tax collectors can simply seize resources from producers at gunpoint without any institutional constraint.
Hence we dene tax power b = χa O as the product of the exclusivity parameter χ 9 We do not explicitly model the decisions to adhere to social norms that underly institutions:
we refer the reader to the literature on repeated games such as Fudenberg and Maskin [28] or Fudenberg Levine and Maskin [27] and especially Kandori [34] 's work on social norms. In an earlier version of this paper Levine and Modica [37] these decisions were explicitly analyzedwithout however leading to dierent conclusions.
10 For computational simplicity in analyzing statics χ and a i will be treated as continuous, but in the analysis of evolutionary dynamics they will be treated as discrete. and target state power. When χ = 0 there is no tax power; when χ = 1 tax power is the same as state power. The actual tax rate is given by τ ≡ min{1, τ b} where τ is a technological parameter specifying how eective tax power is in collecting taxes.
We assume τ > 1; otherwise as we show in the appendix optimal state power is zero for all χ.
Producers are represented by a single representative player. Eort translates into output one for one. Producer's utility is output net of taxes and the quadratic cost of providing eort, plus a benet from public goods provided through state power:
Note that the cost function has been normalized so that the marginal cost of a unit of eort is 1 and that γ measures the extent to which state power is useful in providing public goods.
State ocials act collusively as the residual claimants of tax revenue net of the resources devoted to building state power: their utility is
Notice that we allow negative utility for state ocials -implicitly they have resources so that the state can operate with a decit. Our results are not sensitive to this modeling simplication as in equilibrium ocials never choose to do this.
An action prole (a P , a O ) for a society is an equilibrium if it is subgame perfect when the ocials move rst, or equivalently, a Stackelberg equilibrium. Results for the quadratic case are worked out in Appendix 2 with a complete analysis in Web Appendix 2. The economy can be summarized by means of the tax-revenue function
(where the term in square brackets is the producer's optimal action) and the prot function
Note that the utility of the representative producer and state ocials are measured in compatible units in the sense that a unit of utility lost by the producer in taxes is a unit of utility gained by the state ocials so that welfare W (b) = u P + u O is is decreasing. Stepping beyond the linear/quadratic case, when these properties are satised we will refer to the economy as proper.
We are interested in which institutions achieve specic benchmarks. Specically in proper economies, we can describe institutions χ for which the equilibrium maximizes state power and for which it maximizes welfare. In Appendix 2 we show that: Theorem 1. In a proper economy there is a unique equilibrium level of state power a O (χ), and it is single peaked in χ; so there is a unique argmax χ * > 0. There is a unique welfare maximizing level of exclusivityχ, andχ ≤ χ * . There is a γ ≥ 1 such that if γ ≤ γ thenχ < χ * .
This says that state power maximization leads to greater exclusiveness than welfare maximization.
We also have a relationship between exclusivity and what Acemoglu and Robinson [2] call extractiveness. In Appendix 2 we show that: Theorem 2. In a proper economy prots Π(χa O (χ)) are decreasing in χ, while tax revenues G(χa O (χ)), tax power χa O (χ), and the utility of state ocials u O (χ, a O (χ)) are all increasing in χ. 11 For χ ≥χ producer utility is decreasing in χ and if γ < 1 so is welfare. If γ ≥ 1 the welfare is decreasing forχ ≤ χ ≤ χ * .
In particular Theorem's 1 and 2 imply that institutions that maximize state power have greater extractiveness than those that maximize welfare.
Dynamics with Two Societies
We now wish to consider how institutions χ are determined by evolutionary pressure. To begin, we analyze a greatly simplied evolutionary dynamic. Subsequently we show that the qualitative properties of this example hold under much broader conditions.
11 We have not specied a relationship between tax power and the tax rate, but expect that as in the linear quadratic case the tax rate is increasing in tax power.
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In our preliminary analysis we assume that there are two societies, that both are proper economies, and that equilibrium action proles are always chosen. These societies share the same technology and dier only in inclusiveness χ. To focus thoughts, it is useful to think of one value of χ maximizing welfare, the other maximizing state power. These two societies will compete over land, with their chances of winning or losing land governed by a conict resolution function that depends upon relative state power. It is no surprise then that evolutionary forces will favor the society with greater state power. Our main questions concerns not does more state power do better? but rather, how much better does greater state power 
Recall that we assume constant returns to scale in land.
Control over land follows a Markov process with state variable L 1t , the amount of land belonging to the weaker society. The transition probabilities are determined by a conict resolution function, in which each period there may be conict resulting in one of the two societies losing a unit of land to the other: that is |L j,t+1 −L jt | ≤ 1.
The conict resolution probabilities will depend on the power of the two societies.
As there are constant returns to scale in land, we dene aggregate state power as L jt a O j . We refer to the loss of a unit of land as a disruption and assume that the probability of disruption depends on the force ratio:
where the constant A 0 > 0 represents the strength of outside forces who are safe behind geographical barriers, but who are equally disruptive towards both societies.
Letting 0 < p < 1/2 be a xed number, we assume a kind of threshold eect: once φ jt falls below a threshold φ > 1 the probability of disruption becomes equal to p (which is interpreted as relatively high). Above the threshold, we assume that the probability of disruption is much smaller; specically, x a number > 0 measuring 8 how small is small, then the probability of disruption is given by
If we dene the resistance r jt = max{0, φ jt − φ} we may write π jt = p r jt . This may be interpreted as resistance to disruption as the probability π jt is decreasing in r jt .
The conict resolution function is governed by four parameters: p, A 0 , , φ. 
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Turning to the other parameters, below the threshold φ a society is not safe in the sense that it has an appreciable chance of losing land. Above the threshold, it is safe in the sense that it has little chance of losing land. The outside forces A 0 determine how easy it is to get past the threshold -with strong outsiders it is hard to be safe because of the threat of the outsiders. The parameter by contrast measures how safe is safe: when = 0, for example, safe means safe forever.
Finally, to simplify the computations, we want to assume that the threshold is such that a society with even L − 1 units of land is below the threshold. In other words, once the enemy gets a foothold, they have an appreciable chance of causing further disruption. We make this assumption only for the purposes of this example.
Specically, we assume that the force ratio with L − 1 units of land for the stronger
to be the resistance to society j gaining a unit of land when landless (increasing in
We can summarize then the Markov process: when society j has no land it has 12 Noting that Western Europe is de facto a hegemony now so that the interregnum has ended. 9 a probability of p ρ j chance of getting one. When a society has at least one unit of land, but is not yet a hegemony, it has a chance p of getting another unit and a chance p of losing one, while if it is a hegemony, it has only a p ρ −j of losing a unit of land.
To understand the dynamics, observe rst that when = 0 the hegemonic states
are transient, so in the long-run there is a hegemony, and if the initial condition is uniform over L 1 , each society has an equal chance of having the long-run hegemony since the Markov process is symmetric in this case.
When
> 0 the situation is quite dierent: all states are positively recurrent and there is a unique stationary probability distribution representing the frequency with which each state occurs. Since this is a simple birth-death chain, the stationary probabilities can be explicitly computed. In particular the stationary probability of society j having a hegemony is
We can manipulate this expression to characterize the average frequency of time the system spends in hegemony:
then in addition σ 2 → 1 and σ 1 → 0. For xed > 0 time spent in hegemony σ 1 + σ 2 declines with outside inuence A 0 and as
Notice that 1/L represents the size of a unit of land relative to the total amount of land. In this model it represents the amount of land that an invader must successfully conquer to get a toehold enough to have an appreciable chance of success. As this grows smaller, the fraction of time there is a hegemony falls to zero. In other words, strong outside forces, and a small toehold needed for success means little hegemony.
We can summarize the proposition by saying that with strong outsiders there is no tendency towards hegemony, while with weak outsiders the tendency is towards a hegemony of the stronger state. Notice that the circumstances that favor hegemony are exactly the same that favor the society with greater state power. This may be more or less exclusivity than the weaker society χ 1 : the alternative society may be excessively exclusive or insuciently exclusive. An interesting case is where the alternative society has institutions that maximize welfare: χ 1 =χ.
From Theorems 1 and 2 we conclude that absent signicant outside inuence there will be a hegemony that will be inecient and excessively extractive. By contrast, when there is signicant outside inuence, hegemony will be much less common, and ecient institutions will persist more frequently.
Generalized Evolutionary Dynamics
We are now going to generalize the static and dynamic models of the previous sections to seek a broader theorem about the emergence and nature of hegemony.
We particularly want to avoid arbitrary assumptions about equilibrium versus nonequilibrium behavior, the number and nature of societies that might compete with one another, and the functional form of the conict resolution function.
To generalize the static model we allow for an arbitrary nite list of societies j = 1, . . . , M . Each society j has a set of players i = 1, 2, . . . , N j , although as in the example we understand these to be player roles that may involve representative individuals or collusive groups (in the example N j = 2). Each player has a nite set of actions a ij ∈ A ij and we denote by a j ∈ A j the corresponding action proles.
We do not explicitly model utility and incentive constraints, but assume rather that for each society there is a set of equilibrium proles E j ⊂ A j . These are the proles for which incentive constraints are satised -although the solution concept might depend on the context -in the example E j is a singleton containing the unique Stackelberg equilibrium in which state ocials are the leader. We allow the possibility that E j is empty. Finally, there is a map from proles to state power: γ j : A j → + . In the dynamic example of the previous section we constrained action proles to lie in E j . We now drop the assumption that incentive constraints are satised at every moment of time, and instead describe a simple learning process by which individuals modify their actions and expectations over time.
We start by considering what a steady state of a learning process should be like. Two things should be true: rst, players should expect that today will be the same as yesterday; second, given that expectation, it should be optimal to play the same way as yesterday. In other words, what happened yesterday should be an equilibrium, and in addition that equilibrium should be expected to recur today. In a learning process, the expectation that today should be the same as yesterday will be based on having observed that in the past this has indeed been true. Suppose that we are not yet in a steady state but in fact yesterday was an equilibrium so that a jt−1 ∈ E j and today is the same as yesterday so that a jt = a jt−1 . A simple model of learning is to assert that in this case that there is a chance 1 > ψ j > 0 that expectations of tomorrow are that it will be the same as today -that we enter a steady state. 
active society achieves a steady state it stays there as long as it remains active.
For unstable societies in which b jt = 0 we assume that there is a transition function P (a j,t+1 |a jt ) > 0 that puts positive weight on all proles. In other words, when people are unsure about the future there is a degree of randomness in their behavior -charismatic leaders may arise, populist nonsense may be believed and so forth.
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Assuming that the system is always in equilibrium as we did in the example is not consistent with this formulation nor is the example consistent with the assumption below requiring duplicate institutions. It is possible to tweak the general model to allow the example as a special case while preserving the main theorem. As the special nature of the example is hard to justify and in any case we already know from direct computation that the theorem holds in it, we will not complicate the general model.
14 This dynamic is essentially a simplied version of the stochastic individual learning procedure 12
Finally, we assume that inactive societies are unstable. Notice that an inactive society becomes relevant only when it gains some land. This represents a group adopting a new set of institutions. We would not expect that people in a newly created society would instantly be in equilibrium: the assumption that inactive societies are unstable is a simple way of modeling the idea that when a society becomes active for the rst time it is not stable and there is an element of randomness in the way in which players initially play. As inactive societies represent potential institutions,
we also wish to allow the possibility that when groups experiment with institutions they experiment with existing institutions but use dierent action proles. That is, just because an active society uses, say, a constitutional monarchy is no reason a break-away group of innovators should not also try to use a constitutional monarchy but taking dierent actions in hope of nding a better equilibrium.
To make precise the idea that it is possible to experiment with existing institutions, dene two societies j, j to use identical institutions if A j = A j , E j = E j and γ j = γ j . Formally, we assume that for every society j there exists a society j = j with identical institutions.
Stepping back, the overall state vector at time t is s t = {a jt , L jt, b jt } J j=1 ∈ S, where b jt is constrained to be 0 when either L jt = 0 or a jt / ∈ E j , and evolves according to a Markov process M ( ) that depends on a parameter ≥ 0. We will study the process for small . To fully specify this process on S we must indicate how land is gained and lost.
As in the example the movement of land between societies is governed by a conict resolution function -except that now we have to contend with the possibility of many societies. As before we continue to assume that at most one unit of land changes hands in any given period. Dene aggregate state power to be Γ jt = L jt γ jt with Γ t and Γ −j,t being the corresponding prole of these aggregates and those of opponents to society j. We assume that the probability that society j is disrupted and loses a unit of land π jt = π(b jt , Γ jt , Γ −j,t )[ ] depends on the stability of the society and on aggregate state power of the society and that of rival societies. Notice that since at most one unit of land can change hands each period M j=1 π jt ≤ 1 and the shocks must necessarily be correlated. The unit of land that is lost is gained by a society chosen randomly according to the function λ(k|j, Γ t ) > 0 for k = j and that Foster and Young [26] introduce and for which they show Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable.
λ(j|j, Γ t ) = 0.
We make several assumptions about the conict resolution function π(
First we assume that for
that it is symmetric in Γ −j , that is the names of the societies do not matter, only their strength. Third, we assume that it is monotone: non-increasing in Γ j and non-decreasing in Γ −j . Fourth, we assume that it is convex in Γ −j which means that concentrated forces are more dangerous than divided ones. Notice that the stability of opposing societies does not matter: how disruptive opponents are depends upon their strength and not upon whether or not they are stable. Of course if they are not stable, the actions taken by that society are likely to change in the future, and as a consequence their future ability to be disruptive may be greater or less than their current ability.
Our nal and key assumption concerns the case of a stable society facing a single opponent. That is except for a single k = j all the components of Γ −j are zero. In this case we assume that the conict resolution function has resistance dened by
where for some φ > 1 we have q(φ) = 0 for φ ≤ φ and q(φ) strictly increasing for φ ≥ φ. We also assume the regularity condition that if r(1,
. These generalize the assumptions concerning resistance in the example, allowing for an arbitrary function form, but keeping the threshold between zero and positive resistance.
We have now dened a Markov process M ( ) on the state space S. Within the state space S we identify certain classes of states as hegemonic. A hegemony s t at (j, a j ) means that a jt = a j ∈ E j , that society j is stable b jt = 1, and that society j has all the land L jt = L. We assume that there is at least one hegemonic classthat is, that the set E j is nonempty for at least one j. For any hegemonic class we can dene Γ(s t ) = Γ j (a j ) to be the state power of the hegemonic society. 15
We can now describe the stationary distribution µ( ) of the Markov processes M ( ) -this tell us how frequently dierent states will occur. We review here some of the important elements of the proof -the remaining details can be found in Web Appendix 1. Examining the role of A 0 we see that hegemonic classes can be ranked by their state power Γ(s t ) with Γ * the maximal state power. The resistance to disruption in a hegemonic classes is
which is non-decreasing in Γ(s t ), and is zero for
and strictly increasing for larger Γ(s t ). Take is absorbing when = 0 since the probability of disruption is zero. If A 0 < A 0 but suciently close, then the only such class will be ones with state power Γ * .
Otherwise we use a method of Ellison to show that only hegemonic states with state power Γ * get weight in µ.
The method of Ellison requires us to compute the least resistance path from one absorbing hegemonic steady class (j, a j ) to another. It turns out this is easy to compute. The key is that the least resistance to losing a unit of land occurs when there is a single opponent who is as strong as possible. This occurs when the opponent is a society k and prole a k such that γ k (a k ) is maximal over all societies 15 There are generally many states making up a hegemonic class: these dier in the action proles used by inactive societies. Note that the resistance of moving from one state in a hegemonic class to another is zero since by assumption inactive societies are unstable and have an appreciable chance of moving to each dierent action prole.
and proles. Such a (k, a k ) may not be an equilibrium and may not be stable, but that does not matter, because there is an appreciable probability that it keeps doing the same thing long enough to overrun (j, a j ). We refer to it as a barbarian horde.
The resistance to the barbarian horde taking over is Ellison's radius R j (a j ) which is strictly increasing in γ j . Moreover, once the barbarian horde has taken over, the resistance to reaching any other absorbing hegemonic steady class is zero.
Because the least resistance to reaching every other absorbing hegemonic class is the same amount R j (a j ) we can show that Ellison's co-radius is
where H are the hegemonic absorbing classes. Ellison shows that as → 0 the ratio of time during which (j, a j ) has a hegemony to the time at which it does not is
If (j, a j ) attains state power Γ * then R j (a j ) > CR j (a j ) and in the limit this ratio goes to innity: most of the time there is a hegemonic class that maximizes state power. [40] or Richerson and Boyd [44] and in Bowles' model of conict and evolution (Bowles [13] ). The equilibrium dimension in the group selection literature is generally missing. One exception is Boyd and
Richerson [15] who consider a setting with multiple Evolutionary Stable Strategies and show that group selection can be operative at the level of the equilibrium.
What does evolutionary theory enable us to conclude about state institutions?
How do the general results compare to that of the example? First, the fact that incentive constraints are not always satised makes little dierence. By assumption the learning dynamic is fast relative to the evolutionary dynamic. We think empirically this is the correct assumption. In situations involving signicant social disruption -for example in refugee camps -people quickly learn how to behave and what to expect and social stability -and equilibrium -no matter how unpleasant and institutionally ineectual -quickly reigns. Note however that during periods of severe conict leading to the fall of institutions that have been long stable, the fact that incentive constraints need not hold in the short run means that unstable and incentive incompatible barbarian hordes will predominant for a brief period.
Returning to our simple example of institutional dierences indexed by the exclusivity parameter χ we see that the results of the simple two-society evolutionary model are reinforced. Since we now allow for many potential societies, it now natural to assume that both state power maximizing institutions χ * and ecient institutionŝ χ are present. Once again we conclude that absent signicant outside inuence there will be a hegemony that will be inecient and excessively extractive, and indeed it will be a hegemony of χ * .
Notice that we have assumed away technological dierences. Exogenous technological dierences can easily be introduced into the model -with the obvious conclusion that given the same institutions and absent signicant outside inuence we expect a hegemony of the superior technology. We do not think, however, that exogenous technological dierences are that interesting: more interesting are endogenous technological dierences that arise from dierence in institutions. Unlike the example, the general model of this section is broad enough to allow for models in which dierent institutions lead to dierent levels of technology 16 . We do not examine such models here, but it provides an interesting area for future research.
Conclusion
Readers of grand theories of history such as those of McNeil [41] , Cipolla [17] , Diamond [20] or Acemoglu and Robinson [3] will not nd surprising the idea that ideas are spread by the conquest of the less advanced by the more advanced -indeed it seems almost ubiquitous in their anecdotes and discussions. Missing from these accounts, however, is a model of dynamic competition between conicting societies.
Here we introduce such a model and nd that there is a tendency towards hegemony when outside forces are weak -but less so when they are strong. 17 We also nd that these hegemonies tend to maximize state power and that this results in ineciently high exclusiveness which in turn determines ineciently high extractiveness, that is high taxes, high income for state ocials, low income for producers, and low welfare.
16 As the model does not allow for the possibility of continuing growth, it is not broad enough to study technologies that lead to dierent long-run growth rates.
17 A recent empirical paper on the relation between warfare and institutions in the Italian Risorgimento is Dincecco, Federico and Vindigni [21] .
An evolutionary model of the type introduced here has dynamics driven by luck, and the intuition of the results follows from understanding this luck. To revolt successfully against a large powerful hegemonic society requires a considerable amount of luck. The larger and more powerful the hegemonic society is, the more luck is required, and so the more persistent it is likely to be. When there are strong outside inuences to support the rebels less luck is required. There is an intuition here as well for the short-lived empires of Alexander the Great, Ghengis Khan or
Tamurlane. The best kind of luck to have in order to successfully overwhelm a powerful neighbor is to have a great deal of military power: a strong military organization, good technology -and a charismatic and brilliant leader. Even better luck is to have that leader convince his followers to set aside their incentive constraints.
Such luck will not last long -eventually warriors or their descendants will prefer to follow their incentives and consume jewelry rather than swords -but the luck can last long enough to conquer the relevant world. These are the barbarian hordes in the proof of our main theorem.
The theory has many implications. In the introduction we gave a broad view of hegemony and the connection to the strength of outside forces. Here we give some more speculative thoughts about institutions and history seen through the lens of et al [23] .
Decreasing exclusiveness. Analyses such as those of Homan and Rosenthal [33] argue that the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy in Europe was determined by the higher tax revenue to be employed for military purposes which a parliament could generate. This can occur in our model if technological change increases the eciency of tax collection τ in which case it will reduce the optimal degree of exclusiveness. For example improved military technology -the development of rearms, for example -can improve the eciency of tax collection (raise τ ) resulting in both state power maximizing and welfare maximizing levels of exclusiveness declining.
Technology and state power. We have modeled the eect of exclusiveness on output as taking place through the tax system. There can also be a direct eect of exclusiveness lowering productivity as suggested for example in Acemoglu and
Robinson [3] .
19 As indicated above, it is possible to study models of endogenous technology driven by institutional dierences in our general evolutionary model. We do not expect that it will change the general nature of the conclusions from the sim- for example, the same desire to protect against outsiders and to conquer them may also inhibit the peaceful arrival of productive immigrants and so lower output. Never-the-less unless this force is very strong, maximizing state power will involve a substantial amount of nationalism. The total number of years covered is 2234. There are ve interregna totally 630 years, so 72% of the period is hegemonic.
Summary of ancient Egyptian history taken from Shaw [47] .
• The total number of years covered is 1201. There are two interregna totally 190 years, so 84% of the period is hegemonic.
24 Additional information about the Parthian Empire from Wright [48] . Note that the conventional dates of the Parthian Empire conclude with the Sassanian Empire, but the hegemony of the
Parthian Empire appears to have ended following the war with Rome in 114 AD, so we take that as the end date.
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Additional history
We count the hegemony of Rome from Augustus in 27 BCE to the permanent division into the Eastern and Western Empires in 395 CE, a period of 422 years.
The Western Empire did not maintain a hegemony for a signicant period after this.
We date the end of the hegemony of the Eastern Empire to the expansion of the Caliphate in 814 CE. -395 a period of 429 years.
In England we date the beginning of the hegemony from the Norman conquest in 1066, a period of 947 years.
We date the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire from the conquest of Egypt in 1517 to the Greek revolution in 1821, a period of 304 years.
Demographic data taken from Maddison [39] Ratio Proof. The problem of the producer is to maximize
. This is negative for all a P ifτ > 1 − c, otherwise it hits zero at 1 − τ /(1 − c). Thus optimal eort is given by
which is obviously concave. From this expression we see that G (0) > 1 is implied by τ > 1. Moreover
Thus prot is decreasing in b and Π (b) < 0. 
and G (b) + bG (b) decreasing implies the objective is continuous and single peaked and so has a unique maximum a O (χ). Note that since G (0) > 1 from the rst order condition the solution a O (1) > 0 implying a positive level of state power is feasible, and hence that the argmax χ > 0.
is a unique maximum at someâ
. Henceχ ≤ χ , and exact equality is possible only if either χ = 0 
So the utility of state ocials is increasing in χ; and from db/dχ = −1/χ 2 G (b) > 0 tax power is also increasing in χ. For tax revenues G(χa O (χ)) since tax power is increasing in χ it is sucient that G (χa O (χ)) > 0, which follows from the rst order condition for maximizing u O . Prots decrease with χ because it is assumed to be decreasing in tax power which increases with χ.
is concave in a O so welfare is decreasing in χ. Since state ocial utility is increasing, it follows that producer utility must be decreasing. For χ > χ we have tax power b increasing and state power a O decreasing. Since producer utility is welfare minus state ocial utility it is u P = Π(b) − G(b) + γa O and Π(b) − G(b) is assumed to be decreasing. When γ < 1 we also have welfare W = Π(b) − (1 − γ)a O decreasing.
M (0). However, a theorem of Ellison [24] shows that these classes have probability zero in µ and the application of Ellison's method yields other useful information about the dynamics.
Let H denote the set of hegemonic absorbing classes, that is, for which s t ∈ h t ∈ H Γ(s t ) > A 0 (φ − 1). In addition to writing s t ∈ H we write (j, a j ) ∈ H when there is a hegemonic state s t at (j, a j ) in H.
To apply Ellison's method we must determine for eachĥ t ∈ H the basin consisting of states not inĥ t for which when = 0 the probability of reaching s t is one. Supposeĥ t is hegemonic atŝ t and (j, a j ), and consider states s t =ŝ t in dierent classes. If π(1, Γ jt , Γ −jt )[0] = 0, since we have assumed that united opponents are stronger than divided ones and φ > 1 it must also be the case that for some k we have π(b k , Γ k , Γ −k )[0] > 0. Hence in this case there is no chance of j losing land, and a positive probability of gaining it, meaning with probability one we return to a hegemonic j. On the other hand if π(1, Γ j , Γ −j )[0] > 0 so that there is a positive chance j loses land, since that will only increase the subsequent chance of losing land, there is a positive probability it will lose all its land and become absorbed in some dierent hegemonic state. Hence the basin are exactly those states for which
The radius is dened as the least resistance path starting at a stateŝ t ∈ĥ t out of the basin. The initial resistance to losing a unit of land is q A 0 + Γ(ŝ t ) A 0 .
Subsequently the greatest chance of losing another unit of land occurs when there is a single opponent who has the highest possible state power. Consider then a society k and prole a k such that γ k (a k ) is maximal over all societies and proles. Such a combination may not be an equilibrium so would be unstable, but we will assume that even if it is an equilibrium it is unstable. Notice that this combination may use the same institutions asĥ t but this is okay because we have assumed that there are duplicate institutions. We refer to such a prole as a barbarian horde. When the opponent is a barbarian horde the resistance to losing land is smallest until the threshold φ is reached and resistance falls to zero. Denote by R j (a j ) the sum of resistances until the threshold is reached, and notice that it is strictly increasing in γ j . Once the threshold is reached there is then a zero resistance path to every other hegemonic absorbing state: the horde remains unstable and takes over all the land with no resistance. Since it is unstable, it than can lose units of land without any resistance, and there is a positive probability independent of so that the land is lost to the target hegemony.
We conclude that the radius of s t is R j (a j ) and this is strictly increasing in γ j . On the other hand, to compute the co-radius of we must nd the hegemonic absorbing state from which it takes the longest to get back to s t . So the co-radius 29 of (j, a j ) is just CR = min (k,a k )∈H\(j,a j ) R k (a k ).
Hence when (j, a j ) attains Γ * so that R j (a j ) is maximal we have R > CR.
Web Appendix 2: Detailed Analysis of the Linear/Quadratic Case
Recall from Appendix 2 the solution to the problem of the producer:
}.
The problem of the state ocial is to maximize
Then for all a O ≤ 1 and also τ χa O < 1 so
Thus for τ χ < 1 the optimal a O = 0 which gives u O (0) = 0. Plugging back optimal choices we can compute utilities. For τ χ < 1 a O = u O = 0, a P = 1 and u P = (1 − c)/2. Note that this is a libertarian equilibrium: ocials impose no taxes because it would be unprotable to do so and producers exert maximum eort. But state power, crucial in interactions with other societies, is zero.
For τ χ ≥ 1 we have
Utility of producers can be computed to be
Utility of state ocials: using τ χa W = (1 + τ χ)/2 and a O (χ) we get
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